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We consider an environment where sellers compete over buyers. All sellers are a-priori identical and strate-
gically signal buyers about the product they sell. In a setting motivated by on-line advertising in display ad
exchanges, where firms use second price auctions, a firm’s strategy is a decision about its signaling scheme
for a stream of goods (e.g. user impressions), and a buyer’s strategy is a selection among the firms. In this
setting, a single seller will typically provide partial information and consequently a product may be allocated
inefficiently. Intuitively, competition among sellers may induce sellers to provide more information in order
to attract buyers and thus increase efficiency. Surprisingly, we show that such a competition among firms
may yield significant loss in consumers’ social welfare with respect to the monopolistic setting. Although we
also show that in some cases the competitive setting yields gain in social welfare, we provide a tight bound
on that gain, which is shown to be small in respect to the above possible loss.
Our model is tightly connected with the literature on bundling in auctions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the main themes in modern economic theory is that the introduction of com-
petition increases social welfare. Many of the anti-trust laws in the western world
are designed to motivate and protect such competition. The study of competition is
a cornerstone of economic theory and ranges from the classical models of Cournot
[Cournot 1838] and Bertrand [Bertrand 1883] models, to advanced competing auctions
[McAfee 1993; Ellison et al. 2004].
Another topic that is well studied is signaling in situations of asymmetric informa-
tion. Starting from Spence [Spence 1997] and Akerlof [Akerlof 1970] seminal work,
this issue has become central to the analysis of strategic interaction. Starting from the
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work of Milgrom and Weber [Milgrom and Weber 1982] it has become central to the
analysis of auctions and economic mechanism design. In this paper we study signaling
schemes in the context of competition. We introduce a simple game which we refer to
as a ‘signaling competition’. In this game sellers compete over buyers by signalling on
the nature of the goods they sell. We study how the strategic use of signaling schemes
effects the social welfare. In particular we compare the single seller setting with that
of competing sellers. The model we use is motivated by the multi-billion ad exchanges
market.
We adopt a model of Emek et al [Emek et al. 2011], motivated by Levin and Milgrom
[Levin and Milgrom 2010]. We adapt the original model to a multi-seller environment.
In this model each firm is an on-line publisher, which auctions ad opportunities to
buyers (advertisers). Any time an internet user accesses a web page that belongs to
the publisher an ad opportunity is created. Ad opportunities are different from one
another and each can be described by a long list of attributes. Some of these attributes
are related to the context of the page (e.g., a page that discusses triathlon events and
hence may appeal to advertisers of sportswear) while others are related to the user
(e.g., a male from Seattle that is a member of a forum on fishing). It is at the publisher’s
discretion to choose which attributes to expose to the potential buyers.4
We consider a finite set of attribute combinations and we refer to each such combi-
nation as a variant of the product. We assume that each ad opportunity is randomly
drawn from some commonly known distribution over the variants (we restrict atten-
tion to a uniform distribution in this work). Each buyer has a known valuation for
each of the possible variants. More specifically, we restrict attention to a binary model
where the value of each variant to a buyer may be either 0 or 1. Social welfare is nat-
urally defined as the probability of assigning a random good to a buyer that values it.
To simplify the analysis and isolate the impact of signalling we assume that all sell-
ers have the same pricing mechanism. In particular, each seller conducts a 2nd-price
auction. Thus, a seller’s strategy is what to signal about the good. A signalling scheme
is modeled as a partition of the set of variants. Note that such a partition is closely
related to the notion of bundling which we discuss later.
The Signalling Competition is therefore a two-stage game, where the sellers choose a
signalling scheme (partition) in the first stage and buyers choose which seller to access
given the publicly announced signalling schemes. Once buyers and sellers match up a
random variant is realized and is allocated according to a second price auction. In fact
such a game captures one instance out of a flow of ad opportunities. We assume, implic-
itly, that the signaling scheme is determined for the whole stream of ad opportunities
and that each buyer’s choice of a seller (publisher) is also fixed throughout. This set-
ting closely resembles situations arising in display ad exchanges (see Muthukrishnan
[Muthukrishnan 2009] for a discussion).
Our main goal is to compare the social welfare in an environment with a single
seller with that of k sellers. We assume that the number of sellers does not impact
the number of ad opportunities. Therefore, we resort to the following natural notion
of welfare - the probability that a random ad opportunity will be allocated to a buyer
that values it. In case there are k sellers we consider the average probability of efficient
allocation among the sellers. This notion is motivated by the fact that a seller will only
receive 1
k
of the ad opportunities.
It is intuitive to assume that competition among sellers could increase efficiency as
such competition induces sellers to provide more information about the product, which
in turn increases efficiency. However, a countervailing force also exists - more sellers
imply that each seller faces a thinner market, which in turn could reduce efficiency.
4There are clearly privacy related issues in this model, which we choose to ignore.
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Market thinning is a major concern in the online advertisement business and is dis-
cussed in depth by Levin and Milgrom [Levin and Milgrom 2010].
Our findings are surprising: the consumers’ social welfare in the competing setting
may severely drop with respect to the monopolistic setting. This is not necessarily
the case and there are situations where the social welfare may also be higher in the
competing setting. However, we provide a tight bound on this efficiency gain, which is
shown to be negligible in comparison to the potential loss due to competition.
It worth to notice that the model of signaling about the instance of a probabilistic
good is technically equivalent to a model of bundling of goods. Indeed, the partition of
the possible variants of a good into clusters, while selling a stream of such instances
along time, can be associated with a fixed bundling of a given set of goods, and sell-
ing all bundles, assuming additive valuations. The use of such bundling of goods in
the context of computational advertising has been discussed in the CS literature in
Ghosh et al [Ghosh et al. 2007], following the rich literature on the bundling of goods,
originated in Palfrey [Palfrey 1983]. Indeed, the idea that neither bundling all items
together, nor selling them separately is optimal has been made explicit in Jehiel et al
[Jehiel et al. 2007]. Our results can be viewed as applicable to the setting of bundling
and to the above setting of signaling, interchangeably. Whereas this literature focuses
on the single auctioneer setting we are interested in the implications of competition
among sellers.
1.1. Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the model and most of the defini-
tions. Section 3 proves the existence of semi-pure subgame perfect equilibria, namely
subgame perfect equilibria where all the buyers play pure strategies. Section 4 focuses
on the single seller case (the monopoly) and provides bounds on the social welfare loss
for a revenue maximizing seller while Section 5 analyzes the loss for the general case.
Section 6 compares the prevailing efficiency in a monopolistic setting with that of a
competitive setting (more than one seller). Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. MODEL
2.1. Definitions
A signalling competition SC = SC(S,B,G, V ), is a game composed of (1) Two mutually
exclusive finite sets of players: the set of sellers S and of the set of buyers B. (2) A
finite set, G, of possible variants of a good. Each seller has a single good for sale. (3) A
valuation matrix,V = (vgb )
g∈G
b∈B , where v
g
b ∈ {0, 1} denotes the valuation of buyer b ∈ B
for the variant g ∈ G. Players’ utilities are assumed quasi-linear.
Slightly abusing notation we will use S, B and G to denote the cardinality of the
corresponding sets as well.
The signalling competition proceeds as follows:
(1) First, each seller commits to a partition on the set G of variants.5
(2) Second, given the sellers’ partitions, buyers simultaneously choose a seller.
(3) Third, a variant of the good for each seller is realized according to a commonly
known prior, which we assume is uniform, and variants are independent across
sellers. Each seller knows which variant is realized but buyers only know to which
element of the seller’s partition the variant belongs (realistically, sellers disclose
this information).
5A partition on a set X is a set of non-empty subsets of X such that each two have an empty intersection
and the union of all the subsets is X.
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(4) Finally, each seller runs a second price auction and goods are allocated to the win-
ners.
A (pure) strategy of a seller s is a partition on the set of variants, G. We will typically
denote such a partition of s by pis and the set of all partitions is denoted Π. An element
pi ∈ ΠS is a strategy tuple of the sellers. A (pure) strategy for buyer b is a function
fb : Π
S → S. Thus, fb(pi) denotes the seller chosen by b for a given strategy profile of
the sellers, pi ∈ ΠS . Buyers bid truthfully and the allocation of the good and its price
are determined according a second price auction (note that we assume truthful bidding
and ignore, from the outset, weakly dominated strategies).
For a buyer b, and a subset of variantsG ⊆ G, let vb(G)
def
=
∑
g∈G v
g
b . Note that
vb(G)
|G|
is
b’s expected valuation conditional on a variant being inG. Let vb
def
= vb(G). Analogically,
for a good g, and B ⊆ B, we define the total demand for g in B by vg(B)
def
=
∑
b∈B v
g
b
and vg
def
= vg(B).
For any B ⊆ B,G ⊆ G, denote by V¯1(B,G)
def
= max
{
vb(G)|b ∈ B
}
and let bˆ denote an
arbitrary buyer that satisfies v
bˆ
(G) = V¯1(B,G). Let V¯2(B,G)
def
= max(
{
vb(G)|b ∈ B \ bˆ
}
)
be the second highest valuation for goods in G by players in B. We drop the reference
to the set of players when we refer to the whole set, B.
Given a strategy tuple pi = (pis)s∈S for the sellers and a strategy tuple f = (fb)b∈B for
the buyers we denote by Bs(pi, f)
def
=
{
bˆ|f
bˆ
(pi) = s
}
the set of buyers that choose s and
by Bb(pi, f)
def
=
{
bˆ|f
bˆ
(pi) = fb(pi)
}
the set of buyers that co-bid with b at the same seller.
Using this notation we can now write an explicit formula for players’ utilities.
The utility of buyer b is ub(pi, f) =
∑
G∈pifb(pi)
max{vb(G)−V¯2(Bb(pi,f),G),0}
|G|
·
|G|
G
, and so:
ub(pi, f) =
1
G
∑
G∈pifb(pi)
max{vb(G)− V¯2(Bb(pi, f), G), 0} (1)
The utility of seller s is
us(pi, f) =
∑
G∈pis
V¯2(Bs(pi, f), G)∣∣G∣∣ ·
∣∣G∣∣
G
=
1
G
∑
G∈pis
V¯2(Bs(pi, f), G) (2)
We extend the notion of utility from pure strategies to mixed strategies in the usual
way, via expectation.
2.2. Social Welfare
Our model assumes a constant stream of goods that is sold via S competing auctions.
Eventually each good is either allocated to a player who values it at 1 or at 0. The
efficiency measure we consider is the proportion of goods allocated to agents that do
value them. Thus, given a strategy tuple (pi, f) we define the social welfare as follows:
SW (pi, f) =
1
SG
∑
s∈S
∑
G∈pis
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), G). (3)
LEMMA 2.1. SW (pi, f) = 1
S
(
∑
s us(pi, f) +
∑
b ub(pi, f)).
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Proof: Note that for each seller s:
us(pis, f) +
∑
b∈Bs(pi,f)
ub(pis, f) =
=
1
G
∑
G¯∈pis

V¯2(Bs(pi, f), G) + ∑
b∈Bs(pi,f)
max{vb(G)− V¯2(Bb(pi, f), G), 0}

 =
=
1
G
∑
G¯∈pis
max{vb(G)|b ∈ Bs(pi, f} =
1
G
∑
G¯∈pis
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), G).
Summing over s ∈ S and dividing by S yields the result.
The next proposition has already been observed by [Even-Dar et al. 2007] and its
proof is omitted:
PROPOSITION 2.2. Assume S = 1, then as the seller’s partition, pis, gets finer the
social welfare (weakly) increases.6
3. SEMI-PURE SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
A signalling competition SC = (B,S,G, V ) together with a tuple of pure strategies,
pi, for the sellers induce a game for the buyers, which we denote by SCpi. A Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium [Selten 1965] of SC is a (possibly mixed) strategy tuple (pi, f) such
that f(τ) forms a Nash equilibrium for the game SCτ , for any pure strategy tuple, τ , of
the sellers. Furthermore, pis is a best reply to the strategy of the other players (pi−s, f).
A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is called semi-pure if buyers use pure strategies.
3.1. The subgame SCτ
We argue that for any pure strategy tuple of the sellers, τ , the induced game SCτ , is a
potential game. Consequently we can conclude it must have a pure Nash equilibrium.
In the game SCτ each player (buyer) must choose a seller and so the players share the
strategy set S. Following [Monderer and Shapley 1996] we say that SCτ is a potential
game if there exists some function P : SB → R such that for any s ∈ SB ∀b ∈ B∀s¯b, sˆb ∈
S:
ub(s¯b, s−b)− ub(sˆb, s−b) = P (s¯b, s−b)− P (sˆb, s−b) (4)
The function P is called the potential of the game.
THEOREM 3.1. For any strategy tuple of the sellers, τ , the game SCτ is a potential
game and the social welfare is the potential.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we consider the game when player b′ is absent. Formally, this
is the game SC(S,B′, G, V ′), where B′ = B \ {b′} and V ′ = (vgb )
g∈G
b∈B′ .
LEMMA 3.2. If S = 1 then for any b′ ∈ B, SW (pi, f) − SW (pi, f ′) = ub′(pi, f), where
f ′ = (f)b6=b′ .
In words, the decrease in social welfare resulting from the absence of buyer b′ is
equal the utility of b′ in her presence.
Proof: Resorting to equation 3 it is sufficient to prove that:∑
G¯∈pi
V¯1(B, G¯)−
∑
G¯∈pi
V¯1(B
′, G¯) =
∑
G¯∈pi
max{vb′(G)− V¯2(B,G), 0}.
6pis is a refinement of pˆis if any set in pˆis is a union of sets in pis.
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Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for any G¯ ∈ pi:
V¯1(B, G¯)− V¯1(B
′, G¯) = max{vb′(G)− V¯2(B,G), 0}.
For any G¯ ∈ pi one of the following cases holds:
—Case 1: vb′(G¯) < V¯1(B
′, G¯) in which case V¯1(B, G¯) = V¯1(B
′, G¯) and vb′(G) ≤ V¯2(B′, G)
and the assertion follows.
—Case 2: vb′(G¯) ≥ V¯1(B′, G¯) in which case V¯2(B,G) = V¯1(B′, G¯) and V¯1(B,G) = vb′(G),
and the assertion follows.
We return to the proof of Theorem 3.1:
Proof: Let τ be a pure strategy of the sellers and let f and g be two strategy tuples
for the buyers satisfying: (1) fb = gb ∀b 6= b′; and (2) fb′(τ) 6= gb′(τ). We shall prove that
ub′(τ, f)− ub′(τ, g) = SW (τ, f)− SW (τ, g).
Let B′ = B \ {b′} and consider a game with the set of buyers B′, with the strategy
tuple f ′ = g′ = (fb)b6=b′ . By applying Lemma 3.2 twice we have:
SW (pi, f)− ub′(pi, f) = SW (pi, f
′) = SW (pi, g′) = SW (pi, g)− ub′(pi, g)
and the assertion follows.
It is well known that any potential game has a pure NE, and so the following is imme-
diate:
COROLLARY 3.3. For any pure strategy tuple of the sellers, τ , the game SCτ has a
pure NE.
This reflects on our model of a signalling competition, as follows:
THEOREM 3.4. Any signalling competition contains a semi-pure SPE.
Proof: For any pure strategy of the sellers, τ set f(τ) to be the pure Nash equi-
librium of SCτ , which exists according to Corollary 3.3. Fixing the buyers strategies
induces a simultaneous move game for the sellers. Let pi be the (possibly mixed) Nash
equilibrium of this game. We argue that (pi, f) is the desired semi-pure a SPE of the
original game.
Let SPE(SC) denote the set of all semi-pure subgame perfect equilibria of SC.
SPE(SC) 6= ∅.
4. SOCIAL WELFARE IN A MONOPOLY
We now study the single seller case. In this game buyers’ strategy set is degenerated
and so, in fact, we have single player game.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Assume S = 1 and B = 2 then as the seller’s partition, pis, gets
finer, buyer’s utility (weakly) increases and the seller’s utility (weakly) decreases.
Proof: Denote B = {a, b}. Now ua =
1
G
∑
G¯∈pis
max
{
va(G¯)− vb(G¯), 0
}
which (weakly)
increases as pis get finer.
The seller’s utility is us =
1
G
∑
G¯∈pis
min
{
va(G¯), vb(G¯)
}
, which (weakly) decreases as
pis get finer.
The claims in Proposition 4.1 do not hold for the case of more than two buyers. We
demonstrate this with the following example:
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Example 4.2. Consider the case of one seller, 3 buyers and 3 variants for the good.
Let the valuation matrix be:
V =
[
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
]
where the bth row represents buyer b and the gth column represents good g. Consider
the partition pi = {{1, 2} , {3}}. If the good is in the set {1, 2}, the second buyer gets the
good and pays 12 . In case the good is in {3}, either buyer 1 or 3 get the good but her full
valuation of 1. Therefore u2(pi) =
2
3
1
2 +
1
30 =
1
3 , the seller earns us(pi) =
2
3
1
2 +
1
31 =
2
3
and the social welfare is SW (pi) = 1.
Compare this with the finest partition τ = {{1} , {2} , {3}}, where u2(τ) = 0 < u2(pi),
us(τ) = 1 > us(pi).
As argued, more information leads to increased efficiency. In some cases (e.g., ex-
ample 4.2) a revenue-maximizing seller would strategically choose to reveal all the
information and maximal efficiency would prevail. Unfortunately, this is not always
the case.
Let us denote by OPT(SC) = max(pi,f) SW (pi, f) the optimal social welfare possible.
THEOREM 4.3. When S = 1 the efficiency obtained in any semi-pure SPE is at least
1
3OPT, and this bound is tight.
For the proof we make use of the following notation. For any subsets G ⊆ G and
B ⊆ B let pi(B,G)
def
=
∣∣{g ∈ G|∑b∈B vgb ≥ i}∣∣ denote the number of goods in G for
which there are at least i buyers in B that value them. In particular p1(B,G) is the
number of goods for which there is some demand and p2(B,G) is the number of goods
for which there are at least two interested buyers. We abbreviate pi(B,G) by pi(G).
Proof: Note it is enough to prove the theorem for any pure strategy of the monopolist
in our single player game.
Suppose to the contrary, that for some valuation matrix V there is a revenue maxi-
mizing partition, pi, such that SW (pi) < 13OPT(SC). In this case there must exist some
G¯ ∈ pi, such that V¯1(G¯)
G¯
< 13 ·
p1(G¯)
G¯
. Without loss of generality we can assume that pi is
degenerated and G¯ = G. Therefore
p1(G) > 3 · V¯1(G). (5)
Let a 6= b be two distinct buyers satisfying va(G) = V¯1(G) and vb(G) = V¯2(G). Define
G′
def
= {g ∈ G|vgb + v
g
a ≥ 1} ⊆ G, the set of goods wanted by a or b, and let G
′′ def= G \G′.
Note that by construction p1(G) = p1(G′) + p1(G′′) and p1(G′) ≤ 2V¯1(G). Combining
this with inequality 5 implies p1(G′′) > V¯1(G). Hence p
1(G′′) > V¯1(G
′′), which in turn
implies that V¯2(G
′′) > 0.
Based on equation 2 we compute the revenue from partitioning G into G′ and G′′:
V¯2(G
′) + V¯2(G
′′)
G
=
V¯2(G) + V¯2(G
′′)
G
>
V¯2(G)
G
,
where the equality V¯2(G
′) = V¯2(G) follows from the construction of G
′. As the right
hand side corresponds to the original revenue we have arrived at a contradiction.
Finally, to prove this bound is tight consider the following valuations:
V =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
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The seller maximizes revenue by disclosing nothing. The ensuing social welfare is 13 ,
while the optimal welfare, obtained when all information is disclosed, is OPT = 1.
Whereas, Theorem 4.3 bounds the welfare in the worst possible outcome, it turns
out, as has already been shown by Ghosh et al [Ghosh et al. 2007] that there exists
some revenue maximizing partition that yields a better outcome:
THEOREM 4.4. Let S = 1, then there exists some seller strategy, pi, such that pi
maximizes the seller’s profit and SW (pi) ≥ 12OPT. Moreover, this bound is tight.
5. SOCIAL WELFARE IN A COMPETITION
When there is more than a single seller we can also expect less-than-optimal social
welfare. In fact, the following example demonstrates that the ratio between welfare in
a SPE and optimal welfare can be as low as 1
G
:
Example 5.1. There are S = 2 sellers, G goods and B = 2 · G buyers with the
following matrix:7
V =


1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0
... · · ·
. . . · · ·
...
0 . . . 0 1 0
0 . . . 0 0 1
1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0
... · · ·
. . . · · ·
...
0 . . . 0 1 0
0 . . . 0 0 1


The optimal social welfare is obtained when the two sellers disclose everything, buy-
ers 1, . . . , G choose seller 1 and buyers G + 1, . . . , 2G choose seller 2. In this case the
social welfare is 1.
On the other hand, consider the following strategy profile:
—Sellers disclose nothing.
—Buyers play as follows:
— If no seller deviates then buyers 1, . . . , G choose seller 1 and buyers G+ 1, . . . , 2G
choose seller 2.
— If seller 1 deviates to partition pi1 then for any G
′ ∈ pi1 let B′ = {b ≤ G : Vb(G′) >
0} be the set of buyers which assign g′ a positive valuation. An arbitrary buyer in
B′ chooses seller 1 while the other choose seller 2. In addition, buyersG+1, . . . , 2G
choose seller 2.
— If seller 2 deviates then use a similar profile.
— If the two sellers deviate play an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium in the induced
subgame (the existence of which follows immediately from Theorem 3.1).
We argue that this strategy profile constitutes a SPE: Clearly a unilateral deviation
of a seller cannot be profitable. As to the buyers, the only non-obvious case is when
a single seller, say seller 1 without loss of generality, deviates. Note that buyers that
have chosen seller 1 will get positive utility whereas deviation to seller 2 yields a utility
of zero. On the other hand any buyer that has chosen player 2 will necessarily get a
utility of zero when going to seller 1.
7This example can be generalized to an arbitrary number of sellers, S ≥ 2, using a valuation matrix which
is defined by S vertical repetitions of the G×G identity matrix.
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In this SPE the social welfare is 1
G
and so the ratio between this and the optimum
is 1
G
.
It turns out that 1
G
is the lower bound on welfare loss if there are sufficiently many
buyers:
THEOREM 5.2. For S ≥ 2 sellers, G goods and B ≥ S buyers satisfying vb(G) >
0 ∀b ∈ B (in words, each buyer has a positive demand), SW (pi,f)
OPT
≥ 1
G
for all semi-pure
SPE (pi, f).
Proof: Let (pi, f) be an arbitrary semi-pure SPE. By the definition of a SPE it fol-
lows that for any pure strategy of the sellers, τ , the strategy tuple, f(τ), is a Nash
equilibrium in the induced game SCτ .
If Bs(τ, f) 6= ∅ then
∑
G∈pis
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), G) ≥ 1.
Therefore, if Bs(τ, f) 6= ∅ ∀s ∈ S then SW (pi, f) =
1
SG
∑
s∈S
∑
G∈pis
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), G) ≥
1
G
.
If, on the other hand, there exists some seller sˆ such that Bsˆ(τ, f) = ∅ (no buyer
chooses seller sˆ). The utility of every player b is no less than the utility after deviating
to seller sˆ, which itself must be at least 1
G
. Therefore ub(τ, f) ≥
1
G
. Lemma 2.1 implies
that SW (τ, f) ≥ 1
S
· B · 1
G
. Since B ≥ S, this implies that SW (τ, f) ≥ 1
G
. As this holds
for any pure strategy τ it must also hold for any mixture. In particular, SW (pi, f) ≥ 1
G
.
On the other hand, the maximal social welfare possible is no more than 1, and there-
fore ratio is at least 1
G
.
In terms of an upper bound, it is easy to construct examples where in equilibrium
the optimal social welfare is obtained (e.g., when vb(G) = G for all players).
6. MONOPOLY VERSUS COMPETITION
We now turn to the central question of this work. Given a valuation matrix, will compe-
tition among sellers increase efficiency? On the one hand competition induces market
thinning for each seller. This may result in low demand and inefficient allocation. On
the other hand, intuition suggests that competition will induce sellers to reveal more
information, thus improving allocation.
Recall that pi = pi(B,G) indicates the number of goods which demand is greater or
equal i. In Theorem 4.3 we have shown that for S = 1, SW (pi, f) ≥ OPT3 =
p1(B,G)
3G . We
now improve upon this bound:
LEMMA 6.1. Let S = 1 and assume pi = {G} is an optimal strategy for the seller.
Then SW (pi, f) ≥ p
1+p2
3G . If, in addition, pi = {G} yields the maximal social welfare
among all revenue maximizing strategies then SW (pi, f) ≥ p
1+p2
2G .
Proof: In the single seller game the buyers have a degenerate strategy and so hence-
forth we omit the reference to f in the notation.
As pi = {G} the social welfare is SW (pi, f) = V¯1(G)
G
and the seller’s profit is V¯2(G)
G
.
In case B = 1 or p2 = 0 or G = 1 both parts of the lemma follow trivially (note that
B = 1 =⇒ p2 = 0). In case B = 2 (2 buyers), p1 = V¯1(G) + V¯2 − p
2 ≤ 2V¯1(G) − p
2.
Therefore, p
1+p2
2G ≤
2V¯1(G)
2G = SW (pi), as required
Henceforth, we assume B ≥ 3, p2 ≥ 1 and G ≥ 2.
Define Gˆ
def
= {g ∈ G|vg(B) ≥ 2}. There are p2 elements in Gˆ. For an arbitrary g ∈ Gˆ
consider the partition p¯i = {G \ {g}, {g}}. Clearly V¯2(G) − 1 ≤ V¯2(G \ {g}) ≤ V¯2(G). If
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V¯2(G \ {g}) = V¯2(G) then the seller’s profit at p¯i is:
us(p¯i) =
1
G
· 1 +
G− 1
G
V¯2(G \ {g})
G− 1
=
1
G
· 1 +
G− 1
G
V¯2(G)
G− 1
>
V¯2(G)
G
contradicting the optimality of pi. Therefore g ∈ Gˆ =⇒ V¯2(G \ {g}) = V¯2(G) − 1.
Applying this iteratively for all p2 goods in Gˆ implies:
V¯2(G \ Gˆ) = V¯2(G) − p
2 (6)
If, in addition, pi is the efficient revenue-maximizing strategy then similar argu-
ments yield
V¯1(G \ Gˆ) = V¯1(G) − p
2 (7)
Let a 6= b be two distinct players such that va(G) = V¯1(G) and vb(G) = V¯2(G). Let
G′
def
= {g : va(g) + vb(g) ≥ 1} ⊆ G be the set of goods demanded by players a or b and
let G′′
def
= G \ G′. Note that the revenue from the partition pˆi = {G′, G′′} is no less
then that of pi, then by the maximality of pi we must conclude that no revenue is gen-
erated from G′′, or more formally, V¯2(G
′′) = 0. In particular, if player c 6= a, b satisfies
vc(G
′′) = V¯1(G
′′), then for any player, d 6= c, vd(G′′) = 0, which in return implies that
{g ∈ G′′|vg(B) ≥ 2} = ∅ and so:
Gˆ ⊂ G′. (8)
Clearly va(G \ Gˆ) ≥ va(G) − p2 ≥ V¯2(G) − p2 = V¯2(G \ Gˆ) and similarly vb(G \ Gˆ) ≥
V¯2(G \ Gˆ).
If max
{
va(G \ Gˆ), vb(G \ Gˆ)
}
< V¯1(G \ Gˆ) then va(G \ Gˆ) = vb(G \ Gˆ) = V¯2(G \ Gˆ) =
V¯2(G)− p2. This implies that g ∈ Gˆ ⇐⇒ va(g) = vb(g) = 1 and so
p1(G′) = va(G
′) + vb(G
′)− p2. (9)
This implies
p1 + p2 = p1(G′) + p1(G′′) + p2 = [va(G
′) + vb(G
′)− p2] + p1(G′′) + p2 ≤ 3V¯1(G).
If, on the other hand,max
{
va(G \ Gˆ), vb(G \ Gˆ)
}
= V¯1(G \ Gˆ) then vc(G \ Gˆ) ≤ V¯2(G \
Gˆ). To see this assume the opposite inequality holds, namely vc(G \ Gˆ) > V¯2(G \ Gˆ), in
which case V¯1(G \ Gˆ) > V¯2(G \ Gˆ) and so there are 2 players that value G \ Gˆ strictly
more than V¯2(G \ Gˆ) which is impossible. Hence, vc(G \ Gˆ) ≤ V¯2(G \ Gˆ) = V¯2(G)− p2.
As G′′ ⊂ G \ Gˆ we know that p1(G′′) = vc(G′′) ≤ vc(G \ Gˆ) ≤ V¯2(G)− p2 ≤ V¯1(G)− p2.
Therefore,
p1 + p2 = p1(G′) + p1(G′′) + p2 ≤ [va(G
′) + vb(G
′)] + [V¯1(G) − p
2] + p2 =≤ 3V¯1(G).
In both cases p1 + p2 ≤ 3V¯1(G). Dividing both sides by 3G yields
p1+p2
3G ≤ SW (pi, f),
as argued in the first part of the lemma.
Henceforth assume pi is the efficient revenue-maximizing strategy. In this case no
social welfare is generated from G′′ and so V¯1(G
′′) = 0. In particular, vc(G
′′) = 0 for
any player, c.
Applying equation 7:
va(G \ Gˆ) ≥ va(G)− p
2 = V¯1(G) − p
2 = V¯1(G \ Gˆ)
Implying
va(G \ Gˆ) = V¯1(G)− p
2 = V1(G \ Gˆ). (10)
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Similarly vb(G \ Gˆ) ≥ V¯2(G \ Gˆ). Since va(G \ Gˆ) = V1(G \ Gˆ), we conclude that
vb(G \ Gˆ) = V¯2(G \ Gˆ) = V¯2(G) − p
2. (11)
From equations 10,11 we conclude g ∈ Gˆ ⇐⇒ va(g) = vb(g) = 1. Therefore
p1 = p1(G′) = va(G
′) + vb(G
′)− p2(G′) = va(G
′) + vb(G
′)− p2. (12)
Adding p2 to both sides and dividing by 2G yields p
1+p2
2G ≤ SW (pi, f), as desired.
LEMMA 6.2. Let S = 1 and assume pi is an optimal strategy for the seller. Then
SW (pi, f) ≥ p
1+p2
3G . If, in addition, pi yields the optimal social welfare among all such
strategies, then SW (pi, f) ≥ p
1+p2
2G .
Note that p
1
G
is actually the maximal social welfare, and so the first part of Lemma
6.2 implies Theorem 4.3 while the second part implies Theorem 4.4.
Proof: Note that it is enough to prove the theorem for the pure strategies, so assume
pi be an optimal pure strategy. For any G¯ ∈ pi consider the game SC(S,B, G¯, (vgb )
g∈G¯
b∈B ).
Namely the game where the set of goods is a-priori G¯. In this game the strategy {G¯} is
optimal for the seller. By Lemma 6.1, part 1:
V¯1(G¯)∣∣G¯∣∣ ≥ p
1(G¯) + p2(G¯)
3
∣∣G¯∣∣ . (13)
Averaging over G¯ ∈ pi:
SW (pi) =
∑
G¯∈pis
∣∣G¯∣∣
G
·
V¯1(G¯)∣∣G¯∣∣ ≥ 1G
∑
G¯∈pis
p1(G¯) + p2(G¯)
3
=
p1(G) + p2(G)
3G
In case, pi is the efficient revenue maximizing strategy, Lemma 6.1, part 2, yields:
V¯1(G¯)∣∣G¯∣∣ ≥ p
1(G¯) + p2(G¯)
2
∣∣G¯∣∣ . (14)
Averaging over G¯ ∈ pi:
SW (pi) =
∑
G¯∈pis
∣∣G¯∣∣
G
·
V¯1(G¯)∣∣G¯∣∣ ≥ 1G
∑
G¯∈pis
p1(G¯) + p2(G¯)
2
=
p1(G) + p2(G)
2G
Fix a set of buyers, B, a set of goods, G and a valuation matrix v. Let Γ1 be the set
of optimal strategies for the for the seller in SC(1, B,G, v) and let ΓS be the set of all
SPE in SC(S,B,G, v). In addition, let Γ′1 be the set of optimal strategies for the for
the seller in SC(1, B,G, v), which yield the maximum social welfare possible there.
6.1. Upper bound
We begin by identifying an upper bound on the social welfare attainable in a competi-
tion. Let c1 = p
1 − p2 be the number of goods with a unit demand.
LEMMA 6.3. Let (pi, f) be an arbitrary strategy tuple in the game SC(S,B,G, V ).
Then SW (pi, f) ≤ c1+min{S,B}·p
2
SG
.
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Proof: Clearly the maximal welfare can be obtained when sellers fully reveal their
information. That is we can assume, W.L.O.G that pi = {{g} : g ∈ G}. Let Gˆ = {g :∑
b v
b
g = 1}. By equation 3:
SW (pi, f) =
1
SG
∑
s∈S
∑
g∈G
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), {g}) =
=
1
SG

∑
g∈Gˆ
∑
s∈S
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), {g}) +
∑
g:
∑
b
v
g
b
≥2
∑
s∈S
V¯1(Bs(pi, f), {g})

 ≤
≤
1
SG
(
∑
g∈Gˆ
1 + p2min {S,B}) =
c1 +min {S,B} · p2
SG
.
THEOREM 6.4. For any B,G, v satisfying B ≥ 2, for any S ≥ 2, any pˆi ∈ Γ1 and any
(f, pi) ∈ ΓS :
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤ 1 +
1
S
.
In words, a competition can result in negligible higher efficiency.
Proof: We define the auxiliary variable ρ
def
= p
2
c1
. We separate the proofs to prove to
the cases ρ ≤ 1 and ρ > 1.
Case 1 - ρ ≤ 1 and c1 > 0: By Lemma 6.2, SW (pˆi) ≥
c1+2p
2
3G and by Lemma 6.3
SW (pi, f) ≤ c1+min{S,B}·p
2
SG
. Therefore the ratio satisfies:
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤
min{S,B}·p2+c1
SG
c1+2p2
3G
=
3
S
c1 +min {S,B} p2
c1 + 2p2
=
3
S
1 + min {S,B} ρ
1 + 2ρ
If min {S,B} = 2, then SW (pi,f)
SW (pˆi) ≤
3
S
1+2ρ
1+2ρ =
3
S
≤ 1+S
S
= 1 + 1
S
, as claimed. If
min {S,B} > 2, the function g(ρ) = 1+min{S,B}ρ1+2ρ is strictly increasing, and obtains its
maximum at ρ = 1. Therefore, SW (pi,f)
SW (pˆi) ≤
3
S
1+min{S,B}
1+2 ≤ 1 +
1
S
, as claimed.
Case 2 - ρ > 1 and c1 > 0: We now use an alternative lower bound on a profit
maximizing single seller’s social welfare, which is p2/G. Therefore:
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤
min{S,B}·p2+c1
SG
p2
G
=
1
S
(min {S,B}+
c1
p2
) =
1
S
(min {S,B}+
1
ρ
) ≤ 1 +
1
S
.
Case 3 - c1 = 0: Using the same lower bound on social welfare as in Case 2 yields:
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤
min{S,B}·p2+c1
SG
p2
G
=
min {S,B}
S
< 1 +
1
S
.
Note that the last theorem, although stated for SPE actually holds for any strategy
profile in the competition setting (S ≥ 2). This bound turns out to be a tight bound,
even if we restrict strategy profiles in the competition to SPE:
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THEOREM 6.5. For any S ≥ 2 there exists a set of buyers, B, and valuations such
that there are strategy tuples pˆi ∈ Γ1 and (f, pi) ∈ ΓS , satisfying: SW (pi,f)
SW (pˆi) = 1 +
1
S
.
Proof: For any S ≥ 2, set B = S + 1, G = 2 and consider the following valuation
matrix:
V =

S
{
0 1
· · · · · ·
0 1
1 0


A single profit maximizing seller may use the strategy pˆi = {1, 2} (i.e., disclose nothing),
yielding SW (pˆi) = 1/2.
For the setting with S sellers, the following constitutes a SPE:
—Sellers strategy: - All the sellers disclose everything.
—Buyers strategy:
— If no seller deviates from the above prescribed strategy then buyer i goes to seller
i, for i < S and buyers S, S + 1 go to seller S.
— If one seller deviates, say seller k < S then then buyer i goes to seller i, for i < S
and buyers S, S + 1 go to seller S.
— If seller S deviates buyer S moves to seller 1.
— If at 2 sellers or more deviate then an arbitrary equilibrium profile of the induced
subgame is played.
The social welfare obtained in this strategy tuple is 1
S
((S−1)12+1·1) =
S+1
2S , therefore
the ratio is 1 + 1
S
.
Recall that Theorem 4.4 provides a different lower bound on the social welfare ob-
tained by a single seller, assuming she chooses a social welfare maximizing strategy,
among all the revenue maximizing ones. In such a case:
THEOREM 6.6. For any B,G, v satisfying B ≥ 2, for any S ≥ 2, any pˆi ∈ Γ′1 and any
(f, pi) ∈ ΓS :
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤
min {S,B}
S
≤ 1.
In words, a competition cannot result in a higher efficiency in this case!
Proof: By Lemma 6.2, SW (pˆi) ≥ c1+2p
2
2G and by Lemma 6.3 SW (pi, f) ≤
c1+min{S,B}·p
2
SG
.
Therefore the ratio satisfies:
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≤
min{S,B}·p2+c1
SG
c1+2p2
2G
=
2
S
c1 +min {S,B} p2
c1 + 2p2
≤
2
S
c1
min{S,B}
2 +min {S,B} p
2
c1 + 2p2
=
min {S,B}
S
≤ 1
Note that the last theorem, although stated for SPE actually holds for any strategy
profile in the competition setting (S ≥ 2). This bound turns out to be a tight bound,
even if we restrict strategy profiles in the competition to SPE:
THEOREM 6.7. For any S ≥ 2 there exists a set of buyers, B, and valuations such
that there are strategy tuples pˆi ∈ Γ′1 and (f, pi) ∈ ΓS , satisfying: SW (pi,f)
SW (pˆi) =
min{S,B}
S
.
Proof: For any S = B ≥ 2, consider the case where every buyer wants each good,
i.e. ∀b ∈ B, g ∈ G : vgb = 1. Here, pˆi ∈ Γ
′1 can be {g}g∈G, yielding social welfare 1.
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Consider the SPE, where ∀pi : fi(pi) = i, and all the sellers disclose everything,
i.e. pi = {g}g∈G. This yields the social welfare 1. Therefore, the ratio is 1 =
min{S,B}
S
.
6.2. Lower Bound
THEOREM 6.8. If S ≥ 2, B ≥ S and vb(G) > 0 ∀b ∈ B (in words, each buyer has a
positive demand), then for for any pˆi ∈ Γ1 and (f, pi) ∈ ΓS :
SW (pi, f)
SW (pˆi)
≥
1
G
,
and this bound is tight.
Proof: As in the proof of the Theorem 5.2, we obtain that SW (pi, f) ≥ 1
G
.
On the other hand, SW (pˆi) ≤ 1. Thus, SW (pi,f)
SW (pˆi) ≥
1
G
.
To demonstrate that the bound is tight we re-visit Example 5.1. In that example, the
social welfare in the SPE is 1
G
, while a profit maximizing single seller may disclose
everything, yielding a social welfare of 1. Thus, the ratio is 1
G
.
7. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the impact on social welfare due to the introduction of competition in a
binary valued model of signaling. As more sellers compete for buyers we expect sell-
ers to reveal more information in order to attract buyers, thus resulting in increased
welfare. On the other hand, it also causes market thinning for any given seller, and so
could decrease social welfare. As we show the potential increase is negligible while the
potential decrease is catastrophical.
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